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Abstract
Redemption laws give mortgagors the right to redeem their property follow-
ing default for a statutorily set period of time. This paper develops a theory that
explains these laws as a means of protecting landowners against the loss of non-
transferable values associated with their land. A longer redemption period reduces
the risk that this value will be lost but also increases the likelihood of default. The
optimal redemption period balances these effects. Empirical analysis of cross-
state data from the early twentieth century suggests that these factors, in combina-
tion with political considerations, explain the existence and length of redemption
laws.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K11
1An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws
I. Introduction
Mortgage redemption laws, which grant a defaulting mortgagor a grace period to
redeem the mortgaged property, are as ancient as the mortgage itself. For example, it is
decreed in Leviticus 25:29-30 that:
If a man sells a house in a walled city, he retains the right of redemption
a full year after its sale. During that time he may redeem it. If it is not redeemed
before a full year has passed, the house in the walled city shall belong
permanently to the buyer and his descendants. It is not to be returned in the
Jubilee. But houses in villages without walls around them are to be considered
as open country. They can be redeemed, and they are to be returned in the
Jubilee.1
Mortgage laws in the United States also have a long history that “bears the scars
of the never-ending struggle between debtor and creditor” (Friedman, 1985: 246).  While
strong laws protecting creditors help both creditors and debtors by ensuring the flow of
credit and promoting development, debtors invariably look to courts and legislatures for
relief during economic downturns.  Thus, the common law concept of “equity of
redemption” emerged early on in English law to allow mortgagors to redeem their
property following default up to a foreclosure date set by the court.  And, beginning in
                                                
1 This citation is due to Capone (1996). In fact, the whole chapter 25 of Leviticus concerns redemption.
21820, state legislatures in the U.S. began to pass laws that extended the redemption
period beyond foreclosure (Skilton, 1943; Friedman, 1985: 247).
In spite of the enduring presence of mortgage redemption laws, economists have
devoted relatively little attention to explaining their function.  Exceptions include Alston
(1984), who studied the causes and effects of mortgage foreclosure moratoria (temporary
relief from foreclosure) enacted during the Great Depression; Jaffe and Sharp (1996),
who discussed foreclosure moratoria as an efficient legislative response to unforeseen
economic downturns, given the incompleteness of mortgage contracts; and Hynes,
Malani, and Posner (2003), who examined the related issue of laws exempting property
from bankruptcy proceedings.  In this paper, we extend this literature by developing a
theoretical model of mortgage redemption that is based on the divergence between the
market valuation of land and the value placed on it by the mortgagor. Specifically, the
theory hypothesizes the existence of a non-transferable component of mortgaged land
that may arise when a mortgagor invests time and effort in learning how to best use his
land.  In the event that the mortgagor defaults on his mortgage, this value is lost because
it is not capitalized by the market. A right of redemption reduces the risk of this loss by
effectively extending the term of the mortgage.  While such an extension strengthens the
mortgagor’s incentive to make investments in non-transferable capital, it also has the
effect of lessening his incentive to avoid default in the first place. The desirability and
optimal length of a redemption period turns on this trade-off.
To provide a context for the theory, Section II briefly examines the history of
redemption laws in the United States.  Following the theoretical analysis in Section III,
Section IV offers some empirical evidence in support of the theory using cross-state data
3from the early twentieth century. Our empirical work contributes to the growing body of
literature that seeks to understand the economic forces driving variations in state laws.2
II.  The Origins and History of State Mortgage Redemption Laws
To provide some background for our analysis, we begin with a brief history of
mortgage redemption laws in the United States. 3  In its modern form, equity of
redemption first appeared in 16th Century English Law, when courts began to allow
mortgagors to repay lenders after passage of the maturity date and thus reclaim
possession of land. Gradually, the law developed into a system of equitable redemption
coupled with strict foreclosure, under which foreclosure was initiated by petition from the
mortgagee to extinguish the mortgagor’s redemption rights. Upon petitioning, the court
would fix a time period during which the mortgagor could redeem the land. After this
time period had elapsed, the mortgagor’s interest was terminated and the mortgagee
would assume full possession of the land.
The chief drawback of the system was the substantial foreclosure costs inflicted
on mortgagees due to the costliness of petitioning the court for a decree of foreclosure.
The only way to extinguish the mortgagor’s redemption right other than by petition was
for the mortgagee to wait 20 years, at which point the mortgagor’s interest was ended by
prescription. Skilton (1943) conjectures that these shortcomings in the English
foreclosure system may have contributed to the apparent diversity in American
foreclosure and redemption laws by encouraging experimentation with other systems.
                                                
2 See, for example, Baker and Miceli (2000), Baker, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2001, 2002), and
Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002).
3 Much of this review of the early history of mortgage redemption relies on Skilton (1943).
4Early on, most U. S. States relied upon foreclosure by public sale, an innovation
from the English law that remains the predominant method of foreclosure in the United
States. In those states where redemption is practiced, the redemption period is usually,
but not always, terminated by sale of the land.4
Since 1820, many states have at one time or another experimented with
statutorily-imposed redemption laws that extend the mortgagor’s right of redemption
beyond foreclosure.  (In some cases, the mortgagor is allowed to remain in possession of
the property during this period.)  Changes in redemption laws have moved in accordance
with broad trends. Table 1, constructed from information in Jones (1882, 1904, 1928),
Skilton (1943), and Mortgage Bankers Association (1997), contains historical and current
information on state redemption laws where available.5
Historically, redemption laws have almost always been about protecting farmers
from economic downturns that placed them under considerable economic duress. For
example, Skilton (1943, p. 326) detects a small bulge in redemption legislation in the
1820’s due to the economic depression following the cessation of the Napoleonic wars.
As Table 1 shows, in the early 1820’s New York (in 1820), Tennessee (in 1821), Illinois
(in 1825), Maine (in 1821), and Missouri (in 1821) all enacted legislation allowing a
redemption period. A similar clustering of changes occurred in the 1890’s, another period
of economic difficulty, when Calfornia (in 1897), Idaho (in 1895), and Oregon (in 1895)
all extended their statutes.
                                                
4 Skilton (1943, page 319) writes that “Strict foreclosure has survived today as the usual remedy in only
two states: Connecticut and Vermont, where English traditions are especially strong.” His source for this
observation is Hanna (1932). Mortgage Bankers Association (1997) verifies that this remains true today.
5 See also Prather (1957) and Bridewell (1938), who provide some additional detail, but which essentially
contain information similar to Skilton (1943).
5The trend over the past sixty years or so, however, has been for states to shorten
their redemption periods or to eliminate them entirely.6  In 1938, at the height of the
Depression, 28 of 48 states in the sample had redemption laws (Bridewell, 1938), but by
1992 only 17 had redemption laws (Mortgage Bankers Assoc., 1997). Further, of those
17 states retaining their redemption laws, 14 had shortened the redemption period.7  This
broad trend is not surprising, given the conjectured link between redemption and
agriculture, coupled with the rather dramatic decrease in the importance of agriculture in
the national economy over this time.  However, it is interesting to note that the South,
historically a heavily agricultural region, did not generally employ redemption statutes.
As our empirical analysis will suggest, this may have been because agriculture in the
South was not as heavily dependent on investment in improvements as in other parts of
the country.
In spite of the time trend and the fluctuations in the nature of redemption laws
over time, they have in fact remained remarkably stable over time. Comparison of the
survey of redemption laws in various editions of Jones (1882, 1904, 1928) with Skilton
(1943) reveals that there was almost no change in mortgage redemption laws across states
over the period 1882-1943.8
                                                
6 Of course, this does not preclude future passage of foreclosure moratoria, which temporarily suspend
foreclosure in times of hardship (Skilton, 1943).
7 Though he does not offer evidence to support his claim, Bauer (1985) reports that redemption laws were
in general use from 1820 to 1920, at which point they began to disappear, in part due to the efforts of legal
scholars.
8This is even more interesting considering the findings of Alston (1984) on the response of state
legislatures to the economic distress of farmers during the great depression through the passage of
mortgage moratorium legislation. On the other hand, the national economy remained heavily agricultural
over this entire time period; in 1880, for example, the percentage of people working in the agricultural
sector was 30%, and it remained around this level in 1930. (Kuznets and Thomas, 1957).
6III. The Model
Previous economic analyses of mortgage redemption laws have not provided a
firm theoretical basis for there pervasiveness.  Most authors have seen them as a product
of the political interplay between creditors and debtors.9  While not denying the
importance of these public choice factors, in this section we develop a theory that
justifies redemption laws based on broader economic concerns.
Consider an individual (the mortgagor) who, at some point in the past, took out a
mortgage to finance the purchase of a piece of property.  Suppose that a balance of B
dollars (principal plus interest) is due at time t=0, the date of maturity. There is, however,
some risk that the mortgagor will default due to random factors that affect his liquidity.
We assume, however, that he can increase his chances of paying off the loan on time by
investing in effort, e (measured in dollars), prior to the due date.  Let p(e) be the
probability that he will not default, where p′>0 and p″<0.
Suppose that the value of the property to the mortgagor consists of two
components: a market value v and an owner-specific value s.  In the case of commercial
property (including farms), v represents the present value of expected cash flows from the
property, while s represents the return from non-transferable investments, goodwill, plus
any utility benefits of ownership (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995: Chapter 5). For
residential property, v is the maximum offer that could be obtained on the market while s
is the mortgagor’s “subjective value,” reflecting, for example, his or her attachment to the
land (Miceli and Sirmans, 1995).
                                                
9 This view is not new, and strong arguments against redemption laws on the grounds that they are purely
redistributive have been put forth by Prather (1957) and Bridewell (1938).
7In the event that the mortgagor has insufficient liquidity to pay off the mortgage
on time (which occurs with probability 1-p(e)), he could avoid default by selling the
property if v≥B.  We assume he would always do so, either voluntarily or by foreclosure,
and therefore we consider only properties for which v<B.  We further assume, however,
that v+s>B, for otherwise, the mortgagor would have no incentive to avoid default and
would likely abandon the property.
The redemption period, if one exists, represents the period of time following
default during which the mortgagor can reclaim the property.  As noted above, equitable
redemption allows the mortgagor to reclaim the property prior to the foreclosure sale by
paying off the loan balance, whereas statutory redemption extends the grace period
beyond the foreclosure sale for a set period of time.  For purposes of the model, we do
not formally distinguish between these cases.  Instead, we simply suppose that there is a
period of length T≥0, following default, during which the mortgagor can re-acquire the
property by paying off B.  In effect, T is an extension of the maturity date for the
mortgage.  Let q(T) be the probability that he does in fact redeem the property during this
period,10 where
q′>0,     q(0)=0,   and     q(∞)=1. (1)
The mortgagor takes the length of the redemption period as given and chooses
effort, e, to maximize his private expected value of the property, given by
VM(e;T) = [p(e)+(1−p(e))q(T)](v+s−B) −  e. (2)
The optimal effort level, eM(T), solves the first-order condition11
                                                
10 Unlike p, we treat q as depending only on time, though it would be straightforward to view it as a
function of mortgagor effort as well.
11 eM(T)>0 given v+s>B, and the second order condition holds given p″<0.
8p′(1-q(T))(v+s−B) = 1. (3)
Totally differentiating this equation yields
0
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The mortgagor’s effort is therefore decreasing in the length of the redemption period.
This reflects a potential moral hazard problem associated with lengthening of the
redemption period and therefore provides the basis for limiting T to a finite length
(possibly zero).
To determine the optimal value of T, we write the expected social value of the
property as
V(T) = v + [p(eM(T))+(1−p(eM(T)))q(T)]s − eM(T). (5)
The derivative of (5) with respect to T is given by
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Using (3), we can rewrite this expression as



∂
∂−−′+′−=∂
∂
T
evBqpsqp
T
V M))(1()1( , (7)
which is ambiguous in sign.  The first term, which is positive, represents the marginal
benefit of lengthening T.  It reflects the fact that a longer redemption period increases the
chance that the mortgagor will retain the non-transferable value of the property, s.
Offsetting this is the second term, which is the marginal cost of a longer redemption
period.  It captures the moral hazard effect noted above—namely, that as T is lengthened,
the mortgagor has less incentive to avoid default, which imposes a cost of B−v on the
mortgagee.  The optimal redemption period, T*, balances these two effects at the margin.
9It is clear from (7) that s>0 is necessary for a positive redemption period to be
optimal, for otherwise, there would be no social benefit of extending the maturity date.  It
follows that redemption statutes (i.e., T*>0) should be more prevalent in regions where
landowners have invested more heavily in non-transferable capital, or where there is high
subjective value associated with land ownership.  This prediction, along with the public
choice factors to be discussed below, forms the basis for the empirical analysis in the next
section.
IV. Empirical Analysis
The model described the fundamental tradeoff underlying redemption laws as
being between the negative impact on incentives to prevent default on one hand and
protection of owner-specific (non-marketable) land values on the other. In addition, it is
undeniable that mortgage redemption laws have historically been driven by the long-
standing public commitment to protect family farms against fluctuations in the value of
agricultural land. For example, Skilton (1943, p. 329) cites the 1895 decision of the
Kansas Supreme Court in Beverly v. Barnitz:12 “…Farms valued five years ago by both
borrower and lender at $3000 or $4000, and mortgaged for $1000, are now knocked
down under the sheriff’s hammer for less than the mortgage debt, the accumulations of a
lifetime being often swept away by the shrinkage…” Further, Friedman (1985: 246) notes
that in the nineteenth century, “[l]egislatures particularly in the West, found debtor relief
politically irresistable.”  Prior research in related areas has also pointed to the possible
                                                
12 Beverly v. Barnitz, 55 Kan. 466, 484 (1895).
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role of the agricultural sector in influencing the nature of lending policies across states.13
Such considerations emphasize the importance of political considerations.
In addition to economic and political factors, empirical work on the origins of
laws must take account of the force of history.  It is therefore important to choose a time
period for analysis over which the issue at hand was relatively important, and for which
sufficient data are available. For this reason, we selected independent variables from
1920, and chose as our dependent variable the state of redemption laws circa 1937 as
reported in Bridewell (1938). Since there was little change in redemption laws over the
period between 1900 and 1943, this configuration of the data positions us as close as
possible to the origins of redemption laws while remaining a recent enough time period to
admit useable data.  In particular, it allows us to employ data similar to that employed by
Alston (1984).   In addition, this time period likely avoids most of the upheaval of the
great depression, and therefore more accurately represents the everyday state of affairs in
a given state’s economy.
As a building block for our model, we initially consider a close relative of the
specification that Alston employed to explain variations in states’ decisions to adopt
mortgage moratoria during the Great Depression.14 His model included two variables to
capture the importance of the farm and the mortgage in a state’s economy: the percentage
of farm income in a state’s GDP, and the percentage of farms that were mortgaged.
Following Alston’s work, we include  data on (1) the percentage of mortgaged farms in
1920 (taken from the 1928 Statistical Abstract of the U. S.); and (2) the percentage of
labor force employed in the agricultural sector in 1920 (taken from Kuznets and Thomas,
                                                
13 See, for example, Alston (1984), who finds evidence for the impact of farm interests, and Hynes, Malani,
and Posner (2003), who do not.
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1957).   These variables capture the public choice forces that undoubtedly influenced the
adoption of redemption laws.
We also include two additional variables to capture the importance of specific
(non-transferable) investments suggested by the theory.  First, we include the percentage
of farm acres that were improved, taken from the 1928 Statistical Abstract of the U. S.
This reflects the degree to which land improvement was important in the state’s
agricultural sector. Additionally, we include the ratio of the value of implements and
machinery to the value of farm land and buildings. This is a further measure of how
important non-land inputs were in determining the overall value of the land.  Together,
these variables serve as proxies for the non-transferable component of land value.
Table 2 presents the means of the dependent variable (=1 if a state had a
redemption period c. 1937, =0 if not) and the above explanatory variables for the sample
as a whole and also for sub-samples grouped by region.15  Regional differences
immediately suggest some broad trends. For example, of the three regions where
agriculture was relatively important based on the percentage of labor employed on farms
(the South, North Central, and West), the South stands out as having had the smallest
percentage of states with redemption statutes (.31 compared to .92 in the North Central
and .91 in the West).  This may be explained by the confluence of public choice and
investment concerns. The percentage of mortgaged farms in the South was much smaller
than in the other two regions (.26 compared to .49 and .44).  In addition, farmers in the
                                                                                                                                                
14 One possible interpretation of our model is as a long run specification of Alston’s.
15 States in the New England Mid Atlantic Region: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. States in the South: Maryland, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. States in the North Central: Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota. States in the West:
12
North Central had a higher rate of improved land compared to the South (.70 versus .53),
while farmers in the West had a higher ratio of added investments compared to the South
(.30 versus .20).  In the industrial northeast, farming was not an important activity during
the sample period, which accounts for the low incidence of redemption laws there.
Table 3 presents the results of fitting some econometric models to this data.
Models I and II are logistic models, where the dependent variable equals one if a
redemption law was present in the state in 1937, and zero otherwise. By comparing
models I and II, one gets the impression that the public choice variables, the percentage
of farm labor in the state and the percentage of farms mortgaged, explain the bulk of the
variation regarding the presence or absence of redemption laws. (This corresponds to
Alston’s (1984) findings.)  However, the investment to value ratio is also statistically
significant and of the correct sign, while the percentage of improved land in farms has the
correct sign but is insignificant.
Model III applies a higher tech approach to the data by making use of variations
in the statute length.  In particular, it fits a Heckman selection model to the data by jointly
estimating the probability that a state has a redemption law, and, given that a state has a
redemption law, the impact of each of the independent variables on the length of the
statutory period. This model was estimated using the logarithms of all variables while
allowing for non-independence in the dependent variable across the four regions
described in Table 2.16  The Chi-square test statistic for independence of the selection and
                                                                                                                                                
Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and New
Mexico.
16 See Baker et al. (2002) for a similar approach to estimating and studying variation in state laws. It is
interesting to note that many of the conceptual issues behind selection models were developed in the
context of law and economics, and in particular in the study of state variation in anti-discrimination
legislation. See Maddala (1982).
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statute length equation is 31.62, which indicates that selection and length cannot be
modeled independently.
Model III reveals some interesting features of the data.  Note first that, while the
public choice variables are significant in both the selection and statute length equations,
the investment variables are only significant in the latter equation.  Thus, it appears that
the public choice variables play the primary role in explaining the presence of a statute in
a particular state, whereas the investment variables only affect the determination of
statute length. Specifically, those states with a larger percentage of improved land and a
higher investment to value ratio adopt longer redemption periods, all else equal.
Interestingly, the percentage of mortgaged farms appears with a positive sign in the
selection equation, but with a negative sign in the statutory length equation. One
interpretation of this result is that those states with a high percentage of mortgaged farms
desired to extend some protection to borrowers by enacting a statute, but when
determining the statute length, they took account of the possibly adverse impact of a
longer redemption period on the overall mortgage market, and hence limited the length of
the statutory period.
V. Conclusion
This paper has developed an economic analysis of mortgage redemption laws in
the United States.  The history of these laws displays both regional variation and
sensitivity to economic cycles, reflecting their role in protecting farmers from loss of
their land during periods of economic downturn. The importance of farming interests in a
14
given state has therefore been a significant factor in bringing about the passage of these
laws, as previous scholars have noted.
While not denying political considerations, we proposed a novel theoretical
justification for redemption laws based on the hypothesized existence of non-transferable
value associated with certain land uses that would be lost in the event of foreclosure.
According to this theory, the optimal redemption period balances the benefit of protecting
this value (i.e., lowering the probability that it will be lost) against the reduced incentive
of the mortgagor to avoid default.  The empirical analysis, which used cross-state data
from the early twentieth century, verified the importance of both political and economic
factors in explaining the presence and length of redemption statutes.
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 Table 1: State Redemption Laws in Historical Perspective
State Redemption
period 1992
Redemption
period 1937
Year of Statutory Origins, with Important
Modifications
Alabama 12 24 1842 (24)
Arizona None 6 1877  (6)
Arkansas None 12 1879 (12)
California None None 1851 (6), 1897 (12)
Colorado 2.5 6 1861 (6)
Connecticut None None
Delaware None None
Florida None None
Georgia None None
Idaho 6 12 1864 (6), 1895  (12)
Illinois 7 12 1825 (12)
Indiana 3 12
Iowa 6 12
Kansas 12 18
Kentucky None 12 1851 (12)
Louisiana None None
Maine 12 12 1821 (36), 1876*
Maryland None None
Massachusetts None None
Michigan 6 12 1827 (24), 1838 (12), 1839 (25) 1840 (12), 1846*
Minnesota 6 12
Mississippi None None
Missouri None 12 1821 (30), 1824 (0) 1877 (12)
Montana None 12 1867 (6)
Nebraska None 9 1859 (12), 1875 (9)
Nevada None 12 1861 (6), 1933 (12)
New Hampshire None None
New Jersey None None
New Mexico 1 9 1889 (12)
New York None None 1820 (12), 1837*, 1839*
North Carolina None None
North Dakota 6 12 1877 (12)
Ohio None None
Oklahoma None 6
Oregon None 12 1885 (4), 1895 (12)
Pennsylvania None None
Rhode Island None None
South Carolina None None
South Dakota 6 12 1893 (12)
Tennessee None 24 1820 (24), 1823*, 1832*
Texas None None
Utah 3 6 1870 (6)
Vermont 6 12 1827 (12.25)
Virginia None None
Washington None 12 1869 (6), 1886 (12)
West Virginia None None
Wisconsin 6 12 1849 (24), 1889 (12)
Wyoming 3 6 1869 (6)
* denotes redemption period shortened or redemption law removed. There may be further changes in
redemption laws we were unable to document.
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Table 2: Means and means by region (Standard Deviations in Parantheses):
Variable All States
(N=48)
New
England/Mid
Atlantic
(N=9)
North Central
(N=12)
South
(N=16)
West
(N=11)
Redemption law
present in 1938?
0.58
(0.50)
0.22*
(0.44)
0.92*
(0.28)
0.31*
(0.48)
0.91*
(0.30)
Ratio of added
investments to
farm value (1920)
0.23
(0.09)
0.29*
(0.07)
0.16*
(0.04)
0.20
(0.03)
0.30*
(0.13)
Percentage
improved land in
farms (1920)
0.51
(0.18)
0.46
(0.16)
0.70*
(0.11)
0.53
(0.10)
0.31*
(0.15)
Percentage farm
labor (1920)
32.5
(17.24)
10.51*
(9.16)
33.84
(13.76)
43.91*
(15.98)
29.33
(9.42)
Percentage farms
mortgaged (1920)
0.38
(0.13)
0.38
(0.08)
0.49*
(0.11)
0.26*
(0.09)
0.44*
(0.10)
*Denotes significant from sample mean at 5% level or smaller.
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Table 3: Fitted Models.
Independent
Variable
I II III
Selection
equation
Statutory
Length
equation
Constant -14.20**
(3.25)
-7.07**
(1.97)
0.89
(1.08)
2.27**
(0.36)
Percent farms
mortgaged, 1920
17.61**
(5.56)
14.49**
(4.45)
3.76**
(0.62)
-0.30**
(0.07)
Percentage labor
force in
agriculture, 1920
0.09**
(.032)
0.07**
(0.03)
1.64**
(0.43)
0.20**
(0.06)
Percentage of
farm land
improved, 1920
3.25
(2.75)
- 0.29
(0.17)
0.51**
(0.07)
Ratio of
investments to
farm value, 1920
12.76*
(6.20)
- 1.09
(0.81)
0.32**
(0.10)
Pseudo R2 .42 .34 Wald Chi square,
ind. Eqns.
31.72
Notes:
1) Standard errors in parenthesis below coefficients.
2) ** denotes significance at 99% level, * denotes significance at 95%.
3) Model III was estimated using by maximum likelihood using the logarithms of all variables,
and allowing for possible interdependence across the four regions described on table 2.
